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The paper aims to investigate the mechanisms of incorrect and misleading reasoning  with particular reference to the 
argumentative fallacies – ideas which many people believe to be true, but which is in fact false because it is based on 
incorrect information or reasoning - widely present today in information and communication policies, highlighting the 
strategies used to influence the behaviour of people and direct the formation of opinions in accordance with guidelines 
functional to systems of power. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The present article aims to illustratesome problematic aspects of contemporary political discourse and how public 
language is losing its power, and how an ominous gap is opening between the governed and those who govern.In 
particular we will examine and discussthese topics: 1. Information and political communication today often use the 
argumentative fallacies, that is a incorrect or misleading notion or opinion based on inaccurate facts or invalid 
reasoning, or an error in reasoning that renders an argument logically invalid;2. the strategies used to influence public 
opinion exploit the vast potential of emotional factors, which always play a central role in any kind of debate, instead 
the factor of rationality is less important. 
 
The analysis is conducted using the tools of rhetoric, the branch of philosophy that Aristotle defined as “the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Rhet. I, 2). It concerns the means which the orator can 
use to ensure that his speech will captivate the audience. Such means may be either rational or emotional ones.For our 
discussion we refer to the hermeneutical function of rhetoric (Reboul 1994: 22-25), it concerns the analysis and 
interpretation of arguments to assess the reliability of the proof confirming the theses they express. 
 
2. The personalization of political discourse 
 
In political discourse it is present more and more oftenthe ad hominem fallacy, or appeal to the person. This kind of 
fallacy occurs when one attempts to discredit a thesis by attacking some of the features of the person endorsing it 
(his/her physical appearance, habits, language, gender, culture, and so on), rather than by adducing relevant arguments 
against the thesis itself. In this kind of reasoning there is no logical relation between the premises and the conclusion, 
with the result that the latter is not inferred from the premises but arbitrarily postulated.  
 
If, for example, Paolo puts forward various reasons in support of the use of the seatbelt, I would be behaving 
incorrectly if I were to dispute this idea by pointing out that Paolo has been charged with fraud. Paolo's arguments in 
favour of the seatbelt may be valid even if he is a man of questionable moral standing and ought to be examined 
independently of any opinion we may have about him, for in this case such an opinion is not relevant to the soundness 
of his thesis (Frixione 2009: 96). If a union representative argues that it is necessary to improve safety measures in the 
factory where he works, since these measures are inadequate to protect the workers, the safety manager may argue that 
this request cannot be taken into consideration because the union representative is not a credible interlocutor because in 
the 1960s he was jailed for resisting arrest. The manager's reasoning is incorrect because in this case he ought to 
evaluate the quality of the safety measures through a risk assessment process, and not judge the union representative's 
past experiences. While patently unfounded, the ad hominem fallacy often proves effective in electoral contexts, where 
it goes hand in hand with the phenomenon known as the “personalisation of politics”, while also being well-suited to 
journalism. Oriana Fallaci (2011: 96), for example, resorted to this kind of fallacy in an interview with Arafat in the 
early 1970s.  
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When Arafat argued that Arab rather than Greek culture ought to be credited with the invention of numbers and 
mathematics, the Italian journalist, who did not share this view, did not set out to show that Arafat's idea was wrong by 
providing evidence of the primacy of Western culture; instead, she sought to discredit Arafat himself by describing him 
in unflattering terms, relying on the fact that in the eyes of the public the negative picture she was painting of Arafat 
would also be seen to extend to his thesis.  
 
It is not always easy to tell whether an ad hominem argument is being used in an acceptable way, not least because it is 
present in all forms of persuasion (Zagarella 2012: 134) and because the acknowledgement of the role played by the 
person in an argument – both on the interpersonal level and on the emotional one – is one of the cornerstones of 
rhetoric. From the very beginning, rhetoric has always regarded ethos, pathos and logos as the fundamental and 
necessary means of persuasion which an orator can employ in order to win over the audience, which will only trust 
him/her if it can identify with his/her methods and approach (Leith 2011: 54-56). The very exponents of “New 
Rhetoric”, Perelman and Tyteca (1958: 121), argue that there is such a close relation of interdependence between a 
person and his/her acts that we often tend to conflate these two very different levels.  
 
As is widely known, Aristotle considered ethos an important benchmark for measuring the credibility of an orator 
within the framework – and by means – of his/her argumentation:  
 
We trust in a greater degree and more readily persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no 
certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, 
not to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character. We must not believe, as some writers argue in their techne, that 
the reliability of the orator in no way contributes to his powers of persuasion; on the contrary, character, so to say, 
constitutes the most effective pistis (Rhet, 1356a 4-13). 
 
In other words, an orator's character is crucial insofar as it takes shape starting from his/her speech and harmonises with 
it: ethos is the product of logos, one of its functions. The ad hominem argument instead becomes an incorrect strategy 
of persuasion that only serves to manipulate the audience whenever it is not in harmony with the orator's argumentative 
strategy and indeed replaces it by simply discrediting one's interlocutor, thereby breaking that delicate balance between 
ethos and logos that Aristotle considered crucial. 
 
One variant of the ad hominem fallacy is the tuquoque argument, which consists in claiming that a person's thesis is 
false because it stands in contradiction to his/her actions. For example: Lucy argues that all living beings have the right 
not to be harmed because they feel the same pain, and therefore that vivisection and animal testing are morally wrong; 
Jane, however, rejects this thesis because Lucy frequently buys products manufactured by pharmaceutical companies 
that engage in such practices. Jane's reaction is unacceptable because Lucy's inconsistent behaviour is not relevant for 
the sake of evaluating her thesis: her behaviour may be regarded as hypocritical, but her thesis is nonetheless sound.  
 
In political discourse this strategy is used when in order to exonerate themselves from a charge of corruption, people 
argue that their opponents are guilty of the same crime; or when they argue that there is no point in showing 
indignation at the corruption of politicians since similar cases of corruption also occur among judges, policemen, 
doctors, and so on. In this case one speaks of a violation of relevance by symmetry. The aim is to suggest to the public 
the idea that if the blame is widespread, and if many people behave in a certain way, there is nothing to worry about 
and the problem ceases to exist. The outcome is paradoxical: if many people commit the same crime, unlawfulness is 
more widespread and the situation more serious; yet this is presented as a mitigating circumstance. Most of the time, 
this patent contradiction goes undetected by public opinion.  
 
There is often a thin line between the tuquoque fallacy and a sound argument. The reason for this is that, generally 
speaking, there is an indisputable connection between a person and his/her acts, so that a person's merit is based on 
his/her behaviour. The constant relation between these two elements engenders what Perelman and Tyteca (1958: 315) 
have described as the “snowball effect”. The mistakes made by a person and the role he/she plays with respect to the 
issue that is being debated can influence our assessment of his/her opinions. This is the case with conflicts of interest 
and testimonies, where the subject's behaviour is indeed relevant. In a debate on the hazards of smoking, a person 
downplaying the risks of smoking is hardly trustworthy if he/she is a tobacco manufacturer. It is clear that in this case 
the person's profile is relevant for the assessment of his/her opinions. Likewise, if a witness to a murder is shown to 
have been drunk at the time, this behaviour makes the testimony invalid (Frixione 2009: 35).  
 
The ad verecundiam fallacy is based instead on the fear of challenging what one regards as an important and 
authoritative source. The expression means “pertaining to modesty”, which leads the listener to rely on the opinion of 
what he/she regards as authoritative figures (Locke 1690: IV, 17, 19).A given thesis is considered valid not because of 
its intrinsic soundness, but because the person or institution upholding it is authoritative and enjoys a good reputation. 
Orators who resort to this fallacy do so in order to put pressure on the audience. 
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They assert the consistency of their argument simply by invoking the statements made by an authoritative or influential 
person, such as the Pope or the President of the Republic. This is the case, for instance, when people claim that 
embryos are living beings, accepting the thesis endorsed by the Church simply because of the prestige and 
authoritativeness of this institution, and not on the basis of any critical analysis.  
 
The elements introduced in the discussion are not pertinent, albeit in an opposite way compared to the ad hominem 
fallacy: instead of being employed to discredit one's opponent, these elements are used to argue that a given thesis is 
valid simply because it is acknowledged as such by an authoritative tradition or by established social convention. Not 
accepting the thesis, therefore, would be a sign of disrespect: once again, the attention shifts from rational proofs to 
elements that are extraneous to the discussion. In the aforementioned interview by Oriana Fallaci, the journalist also 
commits this kind of fallacy when she considers Western culture to be valid and superior in terms of its value system, 
deeming those who do not identify with it unworthy of social consideration. As in the case of the ad hominem fallacy, 
one of the fundamental laws of free debate is broken here (Emeren H.,GrootendorstR. 2004), namely respect for one's 
opponent and the admissibility of different points of view; when these no longer apply, debate becomes impossible and 
conversation turns into a monologue.  
 
The lack of consideration and respect for one's opponent is rather common in public debate and also takes the form of 
the so-called scarecrow or straw man fallacy. The name comes from medieval jousting, when participants, before 
facing their opponents, would train using straw mannequins. The fallacy in this case lies in the fact that instead of 
refuting the thesis of one's opponent, the speaker refers to a different thesis (the “straw man”) that is less plausible than 
the former and is specifically construed in such a way as to be more easily attacked. For example: in a television 
debate, A. argues that it would be important to ensure the rights of immigrants by avoiding indiscriminate repatriation 
and assessing each individual case; B. replies that it is unthinkable to welcome all asylum-seekers and accuses A. of 
seeking to destroy the country by accepting a ruinous invasion. B. response is misleading because A. has not said that 
we should accept all asylum requests indiscriminately. To take another example, A. argues that according to cognitive 
science the human brain works like a calculator; however, this is absurd because human memory does not work like the 
memory of a calculator; hence, cognitive science is wrong. The argument is false because cognitive science does not 
make this kind of claim at all: the speaker is painting a distorted and grotesque picture of the complex and multifaceted 
theses expounded by cognitive science.  
 
3. The incorrect and inappropriate arguments 
 
The issue of incorrect reasoning and fallacious argumentative techniques has been investigated throughout the history 
of rhetoric, from ancient Greece to the present day. It is examined both in Aristotle's Rhetoric and in the Sophistical 
Refutations, where it is noted that opinions presented in public speeches are based on arguments which, in turn, are 
based on inferential processes that enable one to draw a conclusion from some premises according to specific rules. 
Generally speaking, an argument is a reasoning (entimema) designed to provide reasons in support of a given claim; 
these reasons are the “premises”, while the claim to be demonstrated is the “conclusion”. The notion of entimemastands 
in contrast to that of apparent entimema which, just like the apparent syllogism, seems to be such but actually is not. 
According to Aristotle, the good orator must be familiar with misleading techniques of persuasion, so as to be able to 
avoid them in his own argument and expose them when they are used by his opponents.  
 
An apparent entimema is one whose conclusion is not inferred from premises but simply juxtaposed to them; and this 
juxtaposition is precisely what misleads one's interlocutor, by giving him/her the impression of being presented with a 
syllogistic reasoning. This effect is created when an orator presents an unfounded causal relation – by stating for 
example that “since a man is elegant and roams about at night, he is an adulterer” (Rhet. 1401b 32) – or when he 
presents a temporal succession as though it were a causal relation: “Demades declared that the policy of Demosthenes 
was the cause of all evils, since it was followed by the war” (Rhet. 1401b 32). In these and other cases described by 
Aristotle, the fallacy lies in presenting a syllogistic chain which does not pass the falsifiability test, because the link 
between the various propositions de facto does not hold.  
 
The issue of what causes produce a fallacious argument is also a central one for leading authors and texts in modern 
philosophy: from Petrus Ramus to Port Royal's Logique and later John Locke. The English philosopher discusses the 
issue of fallacies in several sections of his Essay on Human Understanding (1690) – both in the third book, devoted to 
words, and in the fourth, devoted to knowledge and probability. In particular, Locke identifies four kinds of fallacious 
argument to which people resort in order to win debates: argumentum ad verecundiam, argumentum ad ignorantiam, 
argumentum ad hominem, and argumentum ad judicem. These are typical examples of the kind of misleading argument 
which, as we will later see, refers to circumstances that are extraneous to the core of one's reasoning. Those who resort 
to these strategies do so in order to shift the public's attention away from the actual content of the argument by focusing 
it on extrinsic factors that are not relevant in themselves.  




Locke's classification of argumentative fallacies proved popular with later authors (Hamblin 1970: 210-25) and led to 
the identification of two other kinds of argument based on the same sort of logical error as the argumentum ad 
baculumand ad populum. We find these, for instance, in Jeremy Bentham's Book of Fallacies (1824) and in Richard 
Whately'sElements of Logic (1826).  
 
In order to be plausible, an argument must meet two basic criteria: correctness and validity. According to the first 
criterion, the premises of a reasoning must be true; according to the second, the logical transition from the premises to 
the conclusion must be made correctly.  
 
Fallacies – in particular so-called non-formal fallacies – are examples of an incorrect reasoning, and depend on many 
different factors: in some cases the premises are implausible because they are based on prejudices or stereotypes, if not 
on downright lies, or may be expressed in an ambiguous and confused way. In other cases, the premises are not 
germane to the argument and undermine the plausibility of the conclusion with respect to the possibility of obtaining 
new information.  
 
While they are incorrect argumentative moves, fallacies may appear to be psychologically persuasive (Hamblin 1970). 
This is explained by the fact that unlike formal logic, within the framework of rhetoric argumentation deals with the 
practical applications of reasoning (e.g. in the ethical, political or legal field) and hence must also meet the additional 
criteria of efficacy and persuasiveness, which has significant psychological implications that are not easy to rationally 
control. This is why fallacies are so common: their apparent correctness makes them particularly suited to the 
intentional and deceptive manipulation of the audience for the purpose of producing a misleading persuasion. I will 
begin my enquiry by focusing on the “petitioprincipii”, which in contemporary political communication has come to 
serve as the typical example of argumentative deception. 
 
The petition principii is an incorrect argument because it includes the conclusion, which is to say what one wishes to 
prove, among the premises. This kind of argument was already criticised by Aristotle, who deemed it unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, it has continued to be widely employed in public speeches: for example, it is commonly found in the 
various forms of political communication because it has an apparently rigorous logical structure that will deceive an 
audience. Many messages that are addressed to the public implicitly – or even explicitly – include among their 
premises the conclusion, which is not the outcome of any reasoning but rather an axiom that is passed off as true 
without any proof. 
 
For example, if in order to persuade an audience of the existence of God we say that “we know that God exists because 
we can see the perfect order of His Creation, an order which shows the supernatural intelligence of its Architect” we 
are slipping into this kind of fallacy because we are assuming that a creator and architect of the universe exists, and that 
the universe shows signs of an intelligent design, without providing any evidence in support of our thesis. This is a 
circular reasoning, then, because the premises and the conclusion can be inverted without changing the outcome.  
 
Likewise, take the following claim: “Abortion is the unjustified killing of a human being; as such, it is murder. Murder 
is illegal. Hence, abortion should be illegal.” This seems like a sound argument because if we assume that abortion is 
murder, it must follow that abortion ought to be illegal, since murder is illegal. But what seems like a rigorous and 
consistent reasoning is actually misleading because the last sentence merely reformulates a principle already expressed 
in the first premise – namely, the fact that the foetus may be regarded as a human being in every respect – without 
adducing any proof of this and indeed completely ignoring the ongoing controversy raging among jurists and scientists 
on the matter. The speaker simply assumes that abortion is murder, without providing any proof that might confirm this 
claim; hence, the conclusion that abortion also ought to be regarded as illegal is unfounded.  
 
The petitioprincipii may vary widely in terms of content, while always maintaining the same argumentative structure. If 
we say that “children's memories of previous lives show that reincarnation exists, since the origin of those memories 
can only lie in past lives”, we are once again committing an argumentative fallacy, since we are assuming that the 
children in question have lived past lives, which is to say that reincarnation is a real phenomenon. To argue that given 
memories find their origin in past lives is tantamount to claiming that past lives certainly exist, which is what ought to 
be demonstrated – not assumed.   
 
The cases considered thus far are all examples of conceptual circularity. This kind of unfounded argument, however, 
can also take the form of procedural circularity (D’Agostini2012: 125), as in the case of fallacies of presupposition, 
where a premise is intentionally constructed by arbitrarily isolating an element from its context in such a way as to 
justify one's conclusion. When discussing the health risks of smoking in an address to Congress in 2009, Al Gore – the 
American Vice President under President Bill Clinton –  criticised those doctors who still maintain that there is no 
proven link between smoking and lung cancer.  
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After the speech, a commentator accused Gore of having argued that there is no proven correlation between smoking 
and lung cancer; Al Gore had indeed uttered that statement, only in a context in which he was making precisely the 
opposite claim. 
 
The petition principii is also harmful because it distorts the very rules of debating: it requires the public to uncritically 
accept a thesis – as though it were a dogma – rather than to reason on a given problem so as to find the best solution. 
The moment we posit self-justifying principles, free discussion is over (Thompson 2016).  
 
4. When emotions are more important than reasoning 
 
In many circumstances, incorrect argumentative moves exploit the vast potential of emotional factors, which always 
play a central role in any kind of debate, to the point of allowing them to take over the whole argument and to override 
the factor of rationality. One fallacy of this sort is the ad misericordiam fallacy, which consists in making an appeal to 
the feeling of pity, by asking one's interlocutor to accept the conclusion of an argument not because of its soundness but 
merely on the basis of the emotions it stirs in him/her. One example is the case of the student who asks the examiner to 
give him/her a passing grade, or else he/she will lose his/her scholarship and be forced to quit university.  
 
Eliciting strong feelings such as fear and indignation is a very effective means that orators have to capture voters' 
attention and win them over to their side. This is a technique widely used by totalitarian regimes – Fascism being a case 
in point – which typically combine the ad misericordiam argument with the captatiobenevolentiae in order to earn 
citizens' consensus, by showing that the people in power actually stem from their ranks. Consider the following extract 
from a speech which Mussolini delivered in Mantua on 25 October 1925: 
 
Mine are not speeches in the traditional sense of the word: they are allocutions, points of contact between my soul and 
yours, between my heart and yours. My speeches, therefore, have nothing to do with the official, stiff speeches 
delivered in another age by men in lugubrious uniforms, men who could not address the people directly because the 
people did not understand them or love them (Mussolini 1983: 95).  
 
These strategies are often associated with the ad populum argument, which exploits feelings shared by the audience and 
which are claimed to be well-founded merely by virtue of their popularity – as in the case of the commonplaces and 
stereotypes concerning immigrants, outcasts, homosexuals and anyone else who is viewed as being somehow different. 
The term demagogy is used precisely to describe an argumentative and political style that systematically resorts to this 
kind of argument (Pratkanis A., Aronson E. 1996). 
 
In a debate, the rousing of passions is actually a useful means to influence and weaken one's opponent. For example, 
speakers might want to stir their opponents' anger by openly doing them wrong and behaving aggressively, because 
their angered opponents will then no longer be able to correctly assess what is most expedient for them. Indeed, 
resorting to the emotional aspect rather than reflection is one of the ten strategies identified by Chomsky (2004: 67) to 
create and control consensus. This technique is effective because it limits critical judgement in the listener and opens 
up the door to unconscious drives that allow the speaker to suggest ideas, desires or prejudices, to induce certain 
behaviour, or to make the listener unaware of errors, falsehoods and deceptions. The more emotionally aroused 
individuals are – gripped by anger, pain or elation – the less refined the categories through which they interpret the 
world around them (Billig 1991). An individual overwhelmed by emotions may operate an over-simplistic cognitive 
subdivision and reduce people to two categories alone: with or against me (Kertzer 1988).  
 
With the ad baculum one instead seeks to make others accept a conclusion through a more or less explicit appeal to 
force. This strategy employs the weapon of blackmail, as in Mafia-style acts of intimidation, where shop-keepers are 
told that unless they pay they will be given no rest, as someone might burn down their stores; or as in those cases where 
workers are invited to accept unfavourable conditions because otherwise their contract may not be renewed. The 
subject here can no longer freely evaluate his/her interlocutor's suggestions and therefore the exchange is no longer 
dialectical.  
 
As a means of persuasion, pathos is a test that must take place within the argumentation itself and not on the basis of 
external elements (Rhet. 1356a 14-15), in accordance with the kind of harmonious relation between reason and feelings 
that is totally lost in the cases we have been discussing, where it is replaced by an openly conflictual relation.  
 
Each day, we receive messages of all sorts that ought to be carefully assessed in order to detect the different kinds of 
fallacies, identify the mechanisms of incorrect reasoning, and thereby protect ourselves from their persuasive potential. 
Democratic power still lies in the hands of citizens, who ought to assess the opinions of politicians and manipulators of 
public opinion (Chomsky 2004). The more aware people are of the importance of this power they wield and the better 
they learn how to use it, the weaker the poison infecting public debate will become, allowing our fragile and 
compromised democratic system to grow stronger and more solid. 
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